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CHINA’S MATURING NAVY
Rear Admiral Eric A. McVadon, U.S. Navy (Retired)
The East Asia security environment in which China is emerging demands thatthe matter of a maturing Chinese navy be put in a political context. Tension
across the Taiwan Strait has recently relaxed. In Beijing, the leaders of economi-
cally successful and internationally active China do not want to jeopardize the
nation’s prospects for a bright future by initiating military conflict with Taiwan
and the United States—quite the contrary. In Taipei, despite profound disagree-
ment with Beijing and a major stir in domestic politics, a cautious posture in rela-
tions with Beijing now prevails. So, remarkably, amid deep, persistent, and mutual
distrust, the current prospects for avoiding conflict across the Taiwan Strait are
good. Well-informed Chinese officials and prestigious
Americans who have had exchanges with senior Chi-
nese leaders confirm the relaxed circumstances and ex-
press the conviction that Beijing is confident about the
situation as Chinese leaders see it developing and that
Taiwan, again content with the status quo, will remain
measured in its actions. War across the Taiwan Strait is
not looming.
Nevertheless, Beijing is, by modernizing its mili-
tary, ensuring that things will not go awry in Taiwan,
that its policy of intimidation continues to work. The
indisputable reality is that this military—the People’s
Liberation Army (or PLA), and particularly its naval
component, the PLA Navy (or PLAN)—is growing
greatly in capability; further, it is a growing concern
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to defense and naval leaders in Washington, D.C., and other capitals, including
Tokyo and Taipei. In a time of American preoccupation with the global war on
terrorism, it is appropriate to draw attention to the crucial features of this modern-
ization of components of the PLA. Beijing, if the “Taiwan problem” were to
suffer a dramatic reversal, would have available an impressive force acquired for
this purpose. If that force were effectively deployed, it would be sufficient in
terms of hardware to undertake a two-pronged, PLA Navy–led campaign, with a
big maritime component, against Taiwan and U.S. forces in a fashion that could
be termed “jointness with Chinese characteristics.”
A MILITARY TO DEFEND AND DETER
When pressed on the subject, Chinese officials began some months ago to de-
liver both publicly and privately (to the author and undoubtedly many others)
the consistent message that the military budget is not excessive, manpower is
shrinking, and the newly modernized PLA is not a threat.1 Chinese characterize
the PLA instead as a deterrent force—as were U.S. forces during the Cold War,
they are quick to remind. When pressed further, they accept unabashedly the re-
tort that the modernization surge is, so far, narrowly focused on the Taiwan con-
tingency. It is directed to deterring Taiwan’s movement toward independence,
which they consider the top “threat to Chinese sovereignty,” and to curbing the
ability of the United States to intervene rapidly and effectively were China com-
pelled, as Beijing perceives it, to use military force against Taiwan.2
So the concern is that hard-liners in Beijing, obsessed by the “Taiwan prob-
lem,” might not allow prudence to prevail in decision making in a crisis and,
consequently, could order the use of military force because of what they perceive
as intolerable “splittist” conduct by Taipei. In evaluating the risks of an impru-
dent decision by Beijing, it might be asked rhetorically whether the current Chi-
nese Communist Party is capable of as bad a choice in a future Taiwan crisis as
most observers think the party made with the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural
Revolution, and the actions in 1989 now referred to simply as “Tiananmen.”
Some observers increasingly find reason to be optimistic, but it is hard to offer
unqualified assurance that Beijing could not again make a very bad decision.
It is the result of decisions obviously made several years ago that a new, mod-
ern, and much more capable PLA Navy has, along with the Air Force and 2nd Ar-
tillery Corps (the ballistic- and long-range-cruise-missile force), been acquired
and deployed. A stunning modernization effort continues. Regardless of how
Beijing’s intentions are viewed, the surge in PLA modernization has radically
changed the military situation for Taiwan. Taipei is more than ever forced to
look to Washington to cope with this more advanced, capable PLA, with the
strategic depth of huge China behind it.
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Moreover, the PLA now hopes to bring to reality concepts its strategists have
written about, such as how an inferior force can prevail against a superior oppo-
nent—that is, China versus the United States. Specifically, the critical aspects of a
new navy and the highly significant synergies that may develop between it and the
missile and air forces warrant full attention, because they are directed specifically at
deterring, delaying, or complicating timely and effective American access and inter-
vention. U.S. forces must be able, should the Taiwan pot boil over, to turn the tables
and deter Beijing from using its proclaimed deterrent forces—or to ensure a favor-
able outcome if mutual deterrence fails. The ultimate American goal, however,
should be to make the chances of conflict even less than they are. Understanding the
important developments described here seems a necessary step toward that goal.
STARTING WITH QUESTIONS
The following questions and answers may be an unusual way to begin probing the
specific naval aspects of the issue, but they focus on an often neglected, but argu-
ably the most surprising, single PLAN acquisition program—its bold move to
build quickly a modern nuclear submarine force despite its troubled past in this
arena. These incisive questions—posed to the author in 2005 by experts on the
Chinese submarine force—are especially useful in that they take the PLA’s Taiwan
obsession fully into account but also look beyond. They reveal the layers of com-
plexity and uncertainty inherent in the very rapid and impressive modernization
of the PLA Navy—a navy that, it is worth emphasizing, is arguably the only one in
today’s world that the U.S. Navy must deter or be able to defeat, but also a navy
that under different circumstances could become a high-seas partner.
• How “mature” is China’s navy? Does the PLAN have the requisite human
capital, organizational practices, and exercise regimen to become a world-
class fleet? The PLAN is most nearly mature with respect to platforms and
weapons but, approximately in the order listed, progressively less so in
human capital, organizational practices, and exercise regimen. It is working
to become better in each.
• Are nuclear submarines a good fit for China’s emerging naval strategy? Will the
balance of forces (i.e., nuclear versus diesel submarines) change in the future?
The currently emerging balance is a good fit, especially vis-à-vis China’s
current set of potential adversaries. If the Taiwan problem were eliminated
somehow, a shift toward nuclear submarines to protect more distant sea-
lanes would be a logical option. This makes the PLAN nuclear submarine
program a possible bellwether for future naval policy more generally.
• What are the trends in undersea warfare and antisubmarine warfare (ASW)
in the western Pacific region? The superiority of the U.S. nuclear submarine
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force will continue; however, the Chinese are apparently developing
ballistic missiles with maneuvering warheads and terminal seekers to hit
ships at sea. This capability to lob numerous accurate ballistic missile
warheads high over the heads of all defenders could effectively circumvent
the anticipated quiet and capable U.S. nuclear attack submarines. The
PLAN has previously seen these submarines as all but impossible to
penetrate with its own submarines (or surface ships) to reach the carriers
and cruisers it wants to disable. Despite the PLAN’s ineptitude at
antisubmarine warfare, short of a (plausible) major breakthrough, the
trend in submarine/ASW competition is going China’s way: the PLAN’s
submarine numbers and diversity trump, or at least could saturate, likely
ASW opposition for the foreseeable future, especially in case of the short
war Beijing contemplates. With respect to Taiwan’s ASW capability (almost
an oxymoron now), the Republic of China (ROC) Navy would still have to
learn to use its P-3C antisubmarine patrol aircraft after getting them; its
prospective new submarine force of eight diesel submarines, if approved
for acquisition (as currently seems unlikely), would be a decade or more
from operational status and even then inadequate for antisubmarine
warfare against what would by then have become a remarkably numerous,
diverse, and advanced PLAN submarine force.
• What strategic dilemmas might Washington encounter as a result of China’s
new nuclear submarine force? Beijing’s smug confidence that Washington
must always keep in mind China’s status as a nuclear power will be
reinforced if the PLAN is successful with its ongoing program to build
several modern Jin-class (Project 094) nuclear-powered ballistic-missile
submarines (SSBNs). Its sequential construction of Shang-class (Project
093) nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) adds the component of
reach (range and speed) to the existing qualities of numbers of its nuclear
and conventional submarines, as well as quietness for a growing portion of
that force and potency of weapons for a similar portion—especially for the
new Kilo-class diesel submarines from Russia, with their long-range,
supersonic, sea-skimming antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs). A “new
PLAN” with these new nuclear-powered submarines and stunning array of
other new and modern platforms and weapons is highly likely to view itself
in a different strategic light, as yet unrevealed, than has the “old PLAN.”
A MATURING BUT STILL ADOLESCENT NAVY
Harking back to the title of this article, the PLA Navy might best be described as
an adolescent rather than mature navy, with the caution that adolescents can
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exhibit qualities across the range from juvenile to adult, often commit crimes
that warrant treatment as adults, and mature unpredictably. To extend the ado-
lescence analogy a bit more, the PLAN is growing remarkably in size and
strength, even “bulking up” (in the American vernacular); all observers remark
how it has grown since the last time they saw it.3
Simply fielding more modern units does not make the PLAN a truly modern
operational force. The limits on how China’s and the navy’s leaders are able to
employ their new capabilities represent significant shortcomings, and success in
the effort to overcome them is far from assured. Put another way, the PLAN has
matured remarkably insofar as acquiring platforms and equipment (ships, sub-
marines, aircraft, radars, and so on) and weapons (antiship cruise missiles, air
defense missiles, torpedoes, and the like) is concerned, but this “new PLA Navy”
has not matured fully in exercising its forces and developing the command and
control capabilities, coordination means, and intelligence and targeting support
needed to make that force fully operational—especially in comparison with its
most important and most capable potential adversary, the U.S. Navy.4
Better officers are on the way up—if they make it. The PLAN recognizes that
to conduct complex joint operations, exercise greatly enhanced command and
control, and effectively employ modern weapons it needs a better-educated,
more worldly officer corps, and it is striving to do that, or so it says.5 PLAN offi-
cers are taking more prominent positions in institutions that do strategic think-
ing; for example, in two recent firsts for naval officers, Admiral Zhang Dingfa
headed the Academy of Military Science (he now serves as the commander of the
PLAN), and Rear Admiral Yang Yi is still director of the Institute of Strategic
Studies at the National Defense University in Beijing. The PLA Navy seeks offi-
cers educated in first-rate civilian universities.6 The emphasis, however, appears
to be on specific technical and scientific education;7 this approach neglects, it
seems, the parallel need for specialists in operations, security issues, strategic
studies, and international affairs.8
Details aside, an important and yet unanswered question is whether the PLA
Navy wants officers better educated or considers them better Red. That is, will
competent, forward-thinking officers be selected for flag rank, or will party loy-
alty and personal connections continue to prevail as the paramount selection
criteria?9 This author has lectured and conferred at the National Defense Uni-
versity and other PLA institutions on several occasions at which junior officers
asked all the questions and did all the talking while flag and general officers who
were students remained silent—at least in part, it appeared, for fear of being
outshone in these lively and insightful discussions. It would seem that at some
point the demands of a modern PLA will force the promotion of more of the of-
ficers who have all the intelligent questions and original thoughts.
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Organization is improving, but maybe not yet enough. The PLA Navy struc-
ture has been streamlined: naval aviation no longer stands alone as though an al-
most separate service; closer ties have been established with the PLAN’s marine
corps; and there are fewer layers in the chain of command.10 Nevertheless, the
author has observed and been told, there is still much deadwood at the top: indi-
viduals in green uniforms with two or more stars on their shoulders (PLA
ground-force generals) who persist in treating the PLAN as mostly an adjunct to
the army, and senior officers who, through lack of vision, fail to move decisively
toward true joint operations. These generals represent obstacles at a time when
real coordination with the 2nd Artillery Corps and the PLA Air Force would lead
to enormous advances in the ability to polish off Taiwan, threaten American inter-
vention capabilities, and keep Japan off balance.
China’s navy is still failing to conduct exercises needed to develop its potential
capability. It continues to steam in the littoral for the most part. However, the
PLAN aspires to, and is erratically striving to conduct, training and exercises in
more distant waters; to make its training more like combat; to challenge itself in
exercises with active, maneuvering opposition forces; and otherwise to add real-
ism to its training and exercise activity. It has even been so bold as to engage, in
August 2005, in a major multiphased exercise with the Russian Navy, a notable
advance beyond the minor, very basic exercises it has conducted with the French,
British, Australian, Pakistani, and Indian navies in recent years.11 A few years ago
the PLAN would not have participated in such exercises at all, fearing not only
prying (as well as spying) but embarrassment, that its shortcomings and back-
wardness would be revealed. Chinese naval leaders now seem sufficiently confi-
dent in their crews to seek international partners for exercises. (It will be
interesting to see if several unflattering post-exercise Russian media reports re-
juvenate concerns that bilateral exercises lead to ridicule and embarrassment.)12
Still, the import of the Russian-Chinese exercise should not be overstated. It
was initially described by many as preparation for countering U.S. forces in the re-
gion. As later and more accurately described, however, it primarily demonstrated
that Sino-Russian bilateral relations are strong, especially military-to-military re-
lations and arms sales. The exercise itself, held in waters just off the Shandong
Peninsula, was hardly a simulation of access denial against approaching U.S.
forces. Its significance in that respect would seem to be less direct. The fact that it
was held at all suggests that the Russians are more likely than we might have sur-
mised to provide logistic and possibly intelligence support—specifically, to offer
to resupply missiles and spare parts for the key Russian weapon systems that
China would employ in combat with Taiwan and the United States.13
If it would be exaggeration, then, to assess this exercise as a sign of emergence
as a fully mature force, the PLAN is creeping toward real blue-water exercises
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with composite task forces including surface combatants, submarines, and avia-
tion. So far, only in occasional and isolated distant submarine transits does it ap-
proximate the task of confronting an enemy, the U.S. Navy, that it might need to
keep at arm’s length, many hundreds of miles from the Chinese coast.14 In short,
the PLAN is not visibly conducting exercises, alone or with other services, that
rehearse confrontation with approaching U.S. Navy forces. The United States
should be alert to such a development with this new force, a force designed to
have the capabilities that could make such operations feasible.
ATTACKS FROM SEVERAL AXES
A new aspect of budding maturity, what could facetiously be termed “socializa-
tion,” is looming and demands attention—the prospect that the PLAN and the
2nd Artillery Corps could (and should) join hands to bolster the nation’s capa-
bility to attack Taiwan and pose a significantly greater and more diverse threat to
the ability of the United States to intervene in the region. The greatly increased
number and highly improved accuracy of China’s medium- and short-range
ballistic missiles (MRBMs and SRBMs), plus strategic and technical writings,
suggest strongly that senior Chinese military leaders have recognized the en-
hancement of naval capabilities that would result from support by ballistic and
land-attack cruise missiles. China’s MRBMs (the DF-21C) and SRBMs (DF-15
and -11), with conventional warheads, have capabilities well beyond the psycho-
logical intimidation of Taiwan.15 Prospective synergies stem from the ability of
these potent missile arsenals to suppress Taiwan’s offensive and defensive air
power, support amphibious and airborne assaults on the island, strike American
bases in the region, and possibly damage heavily Taiwanese naval forces before
they could leave port.
However, the most important aspect of the increasing ballistic-missile threat
is the prospect that within a few years China may be able seriously to threaten
not only American land bases but also carrier strike groups, with maneuvering
reentry vehicles (MaRVs).16 MaRVed missiles, with conventional warheads,
would maneuver both to enhance warhead survival (defeat missile defenses)
and home on mobile (or stationary) targets.17 The implications for the PLAN of
this prospective 2nd Artillery capability are, of course, profound; they include
the ability to degrade U.S. air and missile defenses (including the Aegis systems
and carrier flight decks). That would allow follow-on attacks by layered, diverse,
and appropriately redundant PLAN submarine, air, and surface forces firing
large numbers of very modern and capable ASCMs, torpedoes, and even their
guns if the earlier attacks suppress most defenses.18 This and what follows are in
clear outline the sort of threat the PLA and PLA Navy wish to pose to U.S. Navy
forces. The precisely focused force the Chinese have built and what they have
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written about its use leave no doubt about the concept—although there are
grave doubts about their ability to conduct it.
Whether, or how soon, the ballistic-missile threat becomes a factor in the
ability of the PLAN to deter, confuse, and delay or, alternatively, confront ap-
proaching U.S. Navy forces, the ability to launch lethal antiship-cruise-missile
attacks is an area where the PLAN is already near or at maturity—even if the tar-
geting of American forces at which to launch them has not reached a mature
state. The PLAN became early a cruise-missile navy, as a way of overcoming
other deficiencies. Now it must be described as a modern cruise-missile navy, at
least with respect to the platforms and lethal, evasive missiles it is deploying.19
The PLAN’s four newest classes of submarines, armed with potent ASCMs, fall
just below MaRVed ballistic missiles in the hierarchy of potential or emerging
threats to U.S. forces.
At the top of the submarine component of the overall threat are the eight new
Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines from Russia that are now being succes-
sively delivered to China. These submarines threaten carrier strike groups
through their ability to launch, while submerged over a hundred miles away, the
SS-N-27B/Sizzler antiship cruise missile.20 After a subsonic flight to the target
area, the SS-N-27B makes a supersonic, sea-skimming, evasive attack.21 It is de-
scribed by its marketers and others as part of the best family of cruise missiles in
the world and, in the opinion of some, as able to defeat the U.S. Aegis air- and
missile-defense system that is central to the defense of carrier strike groups.22
Shang-class (Type 093) SSNs are possible partners for the new Kilos. The sur-
prisingly rapid construction of successive units in this new class of nuclear-powered
attack submarine implies special utility in a Taiwan contingency. The Shangs
could, if they prove sufficiently quiet and fast and are properly equipped with
sensors, be part of the net by which the PLAN locates and identifies approaching
U.S. carrier strike groups.23 If used this way, they could be part of a matrix com-
posed of such detection and reporting means as satellites, merchant ships, and
even fishing boats with satellite phones.
Having served as part of the matrix that detects targets for the ballistic mis-
siles and Kilos, the Shangs could then join with the Song- and Yuan-class non-
nuclear submarines (SSs) in attacks against selected U.S. forces that have, as
expected in the sequenced PLA attack concept, suffered by that point significant
degradation of their air and missile defenses.24 These three classes of submarines
could carry out, from several attack axes, submerged launches of large salvoes of
subsonic, but still very capable, ASCMs. Of course, further follow-on attacks by
torpedoes cannot be discounted if they appear to be needed.
China’s other new nuclear-powered submarine program, the Jin-class (Project
094) ballistic-missile submarine, is primarily a part of China’s strategic deterrent,
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but it will necessarily play a role as backdrop for this Taiwan scenario.25 As with
China’s modernized and augmented land-based intercontinental ballistic mis-
siles, Beijing can act more confidently in bold undertakings vis-à-vis the United
States when its strategic forces are more secure. With the Jins, Beijing is adding a
layer of insurance that American missile defenses could be saturated—and that
Washington would know it. Washington, of course, would have to take into ac-
count the fact that it is dealing with a capable nuclear power whose missiles have
become very mobile and hard to detect.
A DAUNTING ASW CHALLENGE
The success of the described PLAN submarine attacks using submerged-launch
antiship cruise missiles depends to some degree on thwarting or coping with
U.S. antisubmarine warfare capabilities, primarily aircraft (P-3Cs and to a lesser
extent shipborne helicopters) and SSNs. One method by which the Chinese
might complicate the ASW picture for the Americans is to use large numbers of
submarines, including the score or more older submarines—Han-class SSNs
and Romeo- and Ming-class SSs—which may be noisy but cannot be ignored. In
round numbers, the PLAN might, in a campaign where it has chosen the time to
ready the crews and initiate operations, be able to deploy more than twenty
modern SSNs and SSs and roughly the same number of older submarines.26 The
long range of the ASCMs carried by the new Kilos means that those submarines
need not come within a hundred miles of the target ships, if targeting informa-
tion can be obtained remotely—greatly expanding the areas that American SSNs
and P-3Cs would have to search. The speed and practically unlimited under-
water endurance of the new Shang SSNs could allow them to close targets
promptly to launch their shorter-range ASCMs after the initial attacks by longer-
range missiles have degraded defenses.
The role of Taiwan in antisubmarine warfare deserves some attention. Tai-
wan’s current ASW capability is minimal. That capability might improve in the
foreseeable future were Taiwan to obtain from the United States the much-
discussed P-3Cs, but that will depend on how seriously the ROC Navy pursues
the demanding task of learning how to do antisubmarine warfare with that air-
craft. If it does that well, Taiwan’s P-3Cs might offer a measure of help in the
big ASW problem that the PLAN could create in the East China Sea and be-
yond.27 The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force would offer another mea-
sure of assistance, if Tokyo were to make a political decision to involve its
forces in that way. All this said, China’s growing and improving submarine
fleet has outpaced U.S., Japanese, and Taiwanese ASW in the difficult littoral
waters of the region, which generally favor submarines seeking to escape detec-
tion.28 Open-ocean areas may be a slightly riskier proposition for the PLAN’s
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submarines, unless they actually achieve the elusive new levels of stealth to
which China aspires.
The previously described antisurface-warfare roles seem the most likely ones
for the PLAN’s new Shangs. It does not seem likely that the PLAN, inexperienced
compared to the U.S. Navy in undersea warfare, would use its few new SSNs—
precious to the Chinese but almost certainly not comparable to American SSNs
in capability and stealth—in an effort to strip the carrier groups of their sub-
marine protection. So far, China has conceded that aspect of the game to the
United States and chosen to avoid dueling with the superior American sub-
marines. By electing to develop a land-based ballistic-missile threat against
ships at sea, China is pursuing a path that could keep U.S. submarines from
blocking a critical initial attack on carrier strike groups. If in the event the ballistic-
missile concept is not usable or fails in execution, the new Kilos with the
SS-N-27B, the many other submarines with ASCMs, and the increasingly capa-
ble PLA naval air force B-6s, FB-7s, and Su-30MK2s (to be mentioned in more
detail later) provide other alternatives that largely avoid American underwater-
warfare superiority. The point is that as the Shangs are introduced into the fleet,
it seems unlikely that they will be expected to take on American SSNs directly.
ENOUGH TO MAKE WASHINGTON PAUSE?
The intensity and persistence of PLAN attacks on U.S. Navy forces could well be
affected by Beijing’s perception of the fragility of a government on Taiwan sub-
jected to a major assault from everything from ballistic missiles to aircraft to
special forces—and much more. It should be remembered that the primary pur-
pose of denying or delaying access by U.S. forces would be to convince Taipei
that waiting for help is futile, that capitulation and negotiation—on Beijing’s
terms—are the only reasonable option. Success against U.S. forces is, therefore,
important largely for its effect on Taipei’s will to fight on. Success in such con-
flict would be sweetest for the PLA if the United States never became actively in-
volved, concern about the capabilities of a modernized Chinese force having led
American leaders to delay or withhold carrier strike groups.
Returning from strategic considerations to the fight itself, were one to occur,
the Chinese can be expected next to deliver air-launched antiship cruise missiles
once the air defenses of the U.S. strike groups, and possibly regional bases as
well, are degraded. So this “layer” in the assault might be the PLA Navy Air
Force, attacking several hundred miles out to sea from China (in some cases
possibly much farther) with potent new air-launched ASCMs fired from new
aircraft from Russia (the Su-30MK2) and indigenous long-range B-6s (a new
version with new missiles) and FB-7 maritime interdiction aircraft, also with
new ASCMs.29 (Note how many times the word new appeared, correctly, in that
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sentence.) Some PLA Air Force aircraft have similar capabilities. At a minimum,
the U.S. Navy would have to be concerned about vulnerability to such an attack
and, if it had, indeed, sustained damage, might feel it had to retreat. Beijing
would make sure that such a development was not lost on Taipei—and we are
seeking here to understand more fully how Beijing envisions a conflict with its
modernized forces, not necessarily the reality.
Surface combatants would be a final layer if a supposedly casualty-averse
Washington and teetering Taipei have not yet taken the point. Cleanup attacks
might in such a case be intended, with very capable ASCMs from the several new
or upgraded classes of destroyers and frigates. These warships are led, with re-
spect to lethal firepower, by Russian Sovremennyys (soon to increase from two to
four) with supersonic, very evasive SS-N-22s.30 China has built or is building
enough new and modernized destroyers and frigates to form several modern
surface action groups, each capable of long-range attacks with almost equally le-
thal, although subsonic, ASCMs. Also—and here it is finally beginning to over-
come a long-standing shortcoming—the PLA Navy is on the way to acquiring
good fleet air defenses using surface-to-air missile systems.31
To capture succinctly the scope of the modernization of the surface combat-
ant force, it can be said that the Chinese are now building and dramatically up-
grading more classes of modern destroyers and frigates (these combatants
clearly outmatch those of Taiwan) than previous rates suggested they might ac-
quire ships in this decade.32
The question that cannot now be answered is whether such a visible and
slow-moving force, even with dramatically improved air defense, could actually
engage even a damaged U.S. force and not be subject to devastating attack by
other American strike forces. There are, however, broader uncertainties for the
PLAN. As noted, the concepts outlined above emerge from the force Beijing is
building and from PLA doctrinal and other writing. Beijing has made hard deci-
sions and executed expensive programs in the ongoing surge in the moderniza-
tion of the PLA, with great emphasis on naval, air, and missile forces for such
operations as described. But surveillance and targeting support will be needed if
this force is to deter or confront American intervention efforts. To that end, it
appears that China is making significant efforts to gain a varied capability from
space, land, sea (including undersea), and air to locate, identify, track, and target
naval forces.33 China is lagging in this arena—real success in the intelligence, sur-
veillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) arena could take a decade—but one might
make a guess that some rudimentary, if not reliable and consistent, capability
could be cobbled together within a couple of years. In other words, there is im-
pending danger that U.S. ships could be detected and effectively targeted. At
least equally important is whether China will be able to coordinate, command,
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and control such operations—that is, what of the C4* to go with the ISR? The
PLAN, although now more realistic and somewhat bolder in its training and ex-
ercises, as mentioned above, has not, for example, touted or otherwise given evi-
dence of rehearsals of encounters with simulated carrier strike groups hundreds
of miles east of China, as it might do as part of a deterrence scheme.
There is, as described, no doubt about the acquisition of modern platforms
and threatening weapons, but there remains puzzlement as to whether and how
promptly the PLA Navy and the other crucial components of the PLA will make
all this capability truly operational. There is, nevertheless, an additional serious
corollary as to whether Beijing would feel compelled in some circumstance to
initiate hostilities against Taiwan and to confront U.S. forces even if prepara-
tions were short of optimal. It is hard to relax with respect to Beijing and Taiwan,
even if we think Chinese command and control is not up to the task.
This all adds up to a complex planning and execution challenge for an inexpe-
rienced PLA. In the scenario depicted above, it would be conducting two major
campaigns simultaneously: one to subdue Taiwan and the other to delay effec-
tive American intervention. The campaign against Taiwan would likely include
initial ballistic-missile and land-attack cruise-missile attacks; special forces,
fifth-column sabotage, and other such actions; information operations; major
air attacks; and amphibious and airborne assaults to secure lodgments to allow
occupation and control of Taiwan. The campaign against the United States, in
addition to being preceded by extensive efforts temporarily to cripple American
C4ISR,† would, it should be remembered, consist of the described ballistic- and
cruise-missile attacks on carrier strike groups and possibly regional U.S. bases,
submarine attacks using various forms of antiship cruise missiles, and then se-
lections from such follow-on options as ASCMs from air or surface forces. This
would be an extraordinarily demanding undertaking against a daunting foe for
a PLA leadership that has no experience in such combat.
The author’s guess is that the PLA would quickly succeed against Taiwan but
would probably falter against U.S. forces, against which it would encounter sur-
prises, countermeasures, and other capabilities that would likely cause severe re-
versals. It must also be remembered, however, both that China’s best strategic
and military minds are working on these problems and that Beijing may feel it
has to act against Taiwan regardless of how challenging the prospect may appear.
Moreover, it is unlikely that the leaders of today’s modernized PLA would tell the
civilian leadership that their military is not ready. On the contrary, Beijing and
M C V A D O N 1 0 1
* C4: command, control, communications, and computers.
† C4ISR: command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance.
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the military have reason to believe that their forces are of such a nature as to
avoid American strengths, like SSNs and advanced C4ISR, and to make the most
of China’s strengths, such as its ballistic and cruise missiles and new conven-
tional and nuclear submarine forces. The United States has the task not only to
deter this modern military that could embolden Chinese leaders but also, irre-
sistibly yet subtly, to lead those leaders to the conviction that a decision to attack
Taiwan is not in China’s interests and would not likely result in reunification.
BEYOND “THE TAIWAN PROBLEM”
The PLA, especially the PLAN, now seems almost wholly, even obsessively, fo-
cused on the Taiwan problem. Two other factors should be taken into account,
however, and already seem to be intruding into Chinese strategic thinking. First,
an emerging China wants to build a military appropriate to the country that it is
becoming. Second, China’s all-important national economic growth, which
keeps the Communist Party in power, is dependent on ocean commerce. As the
PLA Navy tries to look beyond Taiwan or to decide what, even now, it should be
thinking about besides that, it sees a long-term capability to secure sea and land
routes for the flow of oil and natural gas, as well as other commodities, as a lead-
ing priority for China.
Will we see an organic air capability and a shift to more nuclear submarines?
A PLA Navy able to carry out that mission would almost certainly have some
form of organic air, so that it could effectively operate beyond the range of
land-based aircraft—far south in the South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca,
even to the Indian Ocean. Current shipyard work on the incomplete aircraft car-
rier Varyag may be the start of a move in that direction, unlike so many Chinese
aircraft-carrier rumors of past decades.34 Another consideration could be a lean-
ing toward submarines with greater range, speed, and independence from land
bases. This could mean that nuclear-powered attack submarines, despite the
added cost, might be preferred over diesel-electric or even air-independent-
propulsion submarines.
SSNs are a possible bellwether of PLAN strategic thinking. China is now build-
ing and buying three classes of nonnuclear submarines: the Kilos, the Songs, and
the Yuans (some speculate about the exact character of the Yuan propulsion sys-
tem). These submarines, along with the older Mings and remaining Romeos,
represent a major investment and will almost certainly constitute a majority of
the submarine fleet for the next fifteen years or more. It will, nevertheless, be
worthwhile to keep an eye on China’s success with the Shang attack class, to
ascertain whether it will feel the need suggested above for a faster, more inde-
pendent force to protect distant sea lanes, and whether an emerging China will
follow the American example and diversify its SSN fleet to include land-attack
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cruise-missile capabilities and the ability to insert special forces—or possibly
other, novel capabilities needed in emerging missions for an emerged China.
China’s navy has developed in many remarkable ways, but perhaps the biggest
test of maturity is the bold attempt to leap to a new status in the prestigious and
unforgiving domain of nuclear submarines—where it had previously faltered.
To a significant degree, the success or failure of its new nuclear-powered sub-
marines, the Jin-class ballistic-missile class as well as the Shangs, is likely to de-
termine future decisions for the Chinese submarine force. The American
example in diversifying its nuclear submarines may also become a factor, in the
form of an example. The outcome for the nuclear submarine force could set the
tone for a navy that either comes to feel that it ranks with the best or, having
“tried out for the pros,” finds that once more it has faltered.
In any case, it is instructive to imagine a particularly intelligent and compe-
tent young Chinese naval officer just beginning his service. That junior officer
must today see the prospect, at least, of a promising career ahead as a nuclear
submariner in a globally capable “real navy”—the prospect of professional chal-
lenge and esteem comparable to that of an American counterpart. That in itself
is a remarkable and telling change from a few years ago, when serving on trou-
bled Chinese nuclear submarines was thought by some to be as much a joke as a
job. Such success as the Chinese submarine force attains would tend to be infec-
tious and to bolster the professionalism of other components of the modern
PLAN, where newfound pride is thriving as well. The PLA Navy is not fully ma-
ture, but it has established its potential for that status in the air, on the sea, and,
conspicuously, under the sea.
N O T E S
This article is adapted from a paper delivered
at the Naval War College’s “China’s New Nu-
clear Submarine Fleet” Research Symposium,
26–27 October 2005.
1. Previously, the author had been told privately
that the PLA was surging in capability because
it finally had the funds from Beijing, the tech-
nologies and assistance from Moscow, and the
realization that Washington was not going to
accept Beijing’s position on Taiwan. Promi-
nent in the recent public exchange was the
Chinese response to three events: first, Secre-
tary of Defense Rumsfeld’s complaints about
the large PLA budget, made at a conference
sponsored by the International Institute for
Strategic Studies in Singapore on 4 June 2005;
second, his similar comments in Beijing in
October 2005; and third, the 2005 annual De-
partment of Defense report to the Congress
on PRC military power. Typical of the
strongly stated disagreement were the widely
noted immediate objection expressed by Cui
Tiankai, top Chinese representative at the
Singapore conference, and the sharp retort of
Vice Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, the former
Chinese ambassador in Washington, as
quoted in the Washington Post on 21 July
2005, p. A24. He chastised the United States
for “improper comments about China’s de-
fensive national defense policy and measures”
and called the buildup “normal national de-
fense building.” Yang asserted that most of
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the new spending went for improving living
conditions for troops, noting, rather disingen-
uously, that the military also “updated some
weapons equipment.”
2. On 4 December 2005, while preparing this ar-
ticle, the author met with two longtime Chi-
nese colleagues, a diplomat (senior foreign
service officer) and a senior PLA Navy officer,
both of them well informed and well con-
nected. They agreed with each other (and un-
knowingly with American observers) that
conflict with Taiwan and the United States
was unlikely and that cross-Strait relations
were relaxed. The diplomats said that
Beijing’s relaxed attitude stemmed in part
from recently enhanced confidence with re-
spect to political developments in Taipei fa-
vorable to Beijing and prospects for eventual
peaceful resolution. They offered no apology
or explanation for the fact that PLA modern-
ization is focused on the Taiwan issue; both
seemed to consider the unprecedented mili-
tary buildup simply appropriately responsive
to the task of deterring and being able to cope
with China’s most important contingency—
the Taiwan-U.S. “threat.”
3. For a description of this PLA Navy, Air Force,
and 2nd Artillery modernization surge, see
the author’s testimony on Capitol Hill on 15
September 2005 before the U.S.-China Eco-
nomic and Security Review Commission,
available at www.uscc.org or at www.ifpa.org/
pdf/mcvadon.pdf. For an exhaustive but illu-
minating description by a non-American
source of the PLAN program, see Mikhail
Barabanov, “Contemporary Military Ship-
building in China,” Eksport Vooruzheniy, 1
FBIS CEP20050811949014, August 2005. This
piece (perhaps unexpectedly) is a remarkably
accurate and uniquely comprehensive open-
source reference on the recent stunning surge
in modernization of the PLAN.
4. U.S. Defense Dept., FY04 Report to Congress
on PRC Military Power (available at www
.defenselink.mil/pubs/d20040528PRC.pdf),
states on page 6: “China has continued to im-
prove its potential for joint operations via de-
velopment of an integrated command and
control network, a new command structure,
and improved C4ISR platforms. As in previ-
ous years, China’s leaders realize that most of
the PLA’s C4ISR equipment lags generations
behind that of the West and are encouraging
a new generation of researchers, engineers,
and officers to find ways to adapt to the de-
mands of the modern battlefield. The acquisi-
tion of advanced C4ISR technology is one of
the principal objectives of PRC collection
activities.”
5. David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Mili-
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ley: Univ. of California Press, 2002), pp. 32,
46–47. “The PLA is still the party’s army, all
officers above the rank of senior colonel are
party members, and the CCP still institution-
ally penetrates the military apparatus.” “The
rules of the game . . . have changed as a result
of several developments: [among Shambaugh’s
listed developments]—Increased profession-
alism in the senior officer corps and a con-
comitant decline in the promotion of officers
with backgrounds as political commissars.”
6. Paul H. B. Godwin, “China’s Defense Estab-
lishment: The Hard Lessons of Incomplete
Modernization,” in The Lessons of History:
The Chinese People’s Liberation Army at 75,
ed. Laurie Burkitt, Andrew Scobell, and Larry
M. Wortzel (Carlisle, Penna.: U.S. Army War
College, Strategic Studies Institute, July
2003), p. 33. Godwin states: “Officer recruit-
ment has been changed to an emphasis on
college graduates rather than selecting from
the ranks of serving enlisted men and
women, and advancement in rank now re-
quires attendance at the appropriate PME
schools.”
7. Bernard D. Cole, “The Organization of the
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN),” in
The People’s Liberation Army as Organiza-
tion: Reference Volume v1.0, ed. James C.
Mulvenon and Andrew N. D. Yang (Santa
Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2002), p. 476. “The
PLAN is emulating the U.S. reserve officer-
training corps (ROTC) programs for producing
well-educated, technically oriented candidate
officers.”
8. Beijing Xinhua, 17 August 1999, translated in
FBIS-CHI-99-0817: “The Chinese navy plans to
recruit about 1,000 officers from non-military
universities and colleges yearly beginning this
autumn in an effort to meet its need for com-
mand and technical talent. . . . [these officers]
will account for 40 percent of all naval offi-
cers by the year 2010.” This was originally
cited in Cole, “The Organization of the Peo-
ple’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN),” p. 477.
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new ideas or techniques.”
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able PLAN officers.
11. These exercises with foreign navies consisted
of search-and-rescue drills, communications
exercises, and even replenishment alongside
in at least one case; however, conspicuously
absent were tactical operations. The author
has been told authoritatively that planned or
proposed exercises with Thailand and other
ASEAN countries will also have the goal of
fostering bilateral relations, not of achieving
operational capability.
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cow Zvezda television, CEP20050919027182, 19
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23. On quietness and sensors, see Zachary Moss,
“Nuclear Submarines Worldwide: Current
Force Structure and Future Developments,”
Bellona Nuclear Naval Vessels, 13 May 2004,
www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/
navy/northern_fleet/vessels/34070.html. On
employment, see Globalsecurity.org, www
.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/
2005/d20050719china.pdf. The U.S. Defense
Department, in its 2005 Annual Report to the
Congress: The Military Power of the People’s
Republic of China, states on page 33: “China is
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nese Defence Today, available at www.sinodefence
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“Type 039 Song Class Diesel-Electric Subma-
rine,” ibid., www.sinodefence.com/navy/sub/
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years with others who have extensive experi-
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27. With respect to Taiwan’s ASW capability and
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changes with ROC naval officers and think-
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visits to Taiwan. For judgments on other as-
pects of the ASW environment, the author re-
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of which was gained with the U.S. Seventh
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28. Benedict, “The Unraveling and Revitalization
of U.S. Navy Antisubmarine Warfare,” p. 97
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dented level of construction and acquisition
of major surface combatant ships. It currently
is deploying seven new major ship classes at
one time, building up to two new ships in
each class per year. These include the Project
956 Sovremennyy-class guided-missile de-
stroyer (DDG); the Type 52B DDG; the Type
52C, Aegis-like DDG; the Type 54 guided-
missile frigate.”
33. U.S. Defense Dept., FY04 Report to Congress on
PRC Military Power, states on pp. 43–44: “Ac-
quisition of modern ISR systems remains a
critical aspect of Beijing’s military moderniza-
tion. China is developing its ISR capabilities
based on domestic components, supplemented
by foreign technology acquisition and pro-
curement of complete foreign systems. PLA
procurement of new space systems, AEW [air
early warning] aircraft, long-range UAVs [un-
manned aerial vehicles], and over-the-horizon
radar will enhance its ability to detect, moni-
tor, and target naval activity in the western Pa-
cific Ocean. It appears, from writings on PLA
exercises, that this system currently lacks inte-
gration and that a fused, efficient ISR capabil-
ity will not be achieved for many years.” See
also Richard A. Bitzinger, “Come the Revolu-
tion: Transforming the Asia-Pacific’s Militar-
ies,” Naval War College Review 58, no. 4
(Autumn 2005), pp. 42–43, 46.
34. For the saga of China and aircraft carrier ac-
quisition, see Ian Storey and You Ji, “China’s
Aircraft Carrier Ambitions: Seeking Truth
from Rumors,” Naval War College Review 57,
no. 1 (Winter 2004).
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